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Abstract
It is not straightforward to define the ethics of responsibility in
cases where the consequences of factors under our control are partly
affected by factors outside our control. One way to approach this
issue is to ask how an increase in one individual’s effort should be
allowed to affect the post-tax income of others. In this paper we show
how different answers to this question can be used to characterize
interesting redistributive mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Inequality can be seen as the result of two types of factors, those that are
under the control of individuals and those that are outside their control. Let
us refer to the first type of factors as effort and the second type of factors
as talent. The fundamental moral intuition underlying the concept of equal
opportunity is that society should accept inequalities that arise from differ-
ences in effort, the principle of responsibility, but should eliminate inequalities
that are due to differences in talent, the principle of compensation (Dworkin
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(1981), Arneson (1989)).1 A central controversy in contemporary ethics con-
cerns where to draw the ‘cut’ between those things that are within a persons
control and those things that are outside a persons control.2 However, even
if we agree on how to make a distinction between effort and talent, it is
not straightforward to design a redistributive scheme that satisfies both the
ethics of responsibility and the ethics of compensation (see Bossert (1995),
Fleurbaey (1994, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d), and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)).
The reason is that it is not always possible to separate the consequences of
effort and the consequences of talent. Unless the pre-tax income function
is additively separable in effort and talent, the consequences of exercising
high effort will depend on a person’s talent. According to the ethics of re-
sponsibility, a person with a specific talent should be held responsible for
exercising high effort, but not for being a person with a specific talent exer-
cising high effort. Hence, from the ethics of responsibility, it follows that a
person should bear the consequences of exercising high effort per se, but not
that she should bear the consequences of exercising high effort as a more or
less talented person. The question is therefore to what extent we can reward
effort without rewarding talent.
There are two ways to approach this question. The standard approach
is to look at the effect on the person who changes her effort and ask what
the appropriate reward for effort should be. Alternatively, one may look at
people who do not change their effort and ask what the appropriate effect
on their post-tax income should be when another person changes her effort.
In this paper, we will explore this latter approach, which has not been much
studied in the literature, and show how it can be used to characterize inter-
esting redistributive mechanisms that attempt to compensate for differences
in talent while at the same time reward effort.3
The analysis is based on the assumption that effort is unaffected by the
tax system. We adopt this approach because we want to focus on how re-
sponsibility may justify rewarding effort even in the absence of incentive
considerations. There is, of course, the further question about how to in-
corporate incentives in such a scheme, but we do believe that a clarification
of the concept of responsibility is needed before we move to more complex
situations.
1For critical reviews of parts of this literature, see Fleurbaey (1995a) and Anderson
(1999).
2See Roemer (1996) for an introduction to the philosophical literature on this issue.
3See also Tungodden (forthcoming) for a related discussion.
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The rest of the paper is organized around different answers to the ques-
tion about how an increase in effort by a person should be allowed to affect
others post-tax income. After presenting the formal framework in section
2, we discuss in section 3 the requirement that the post-tax income of indi-
viduals should be independent of the increase in effort of other individuals.
As is well-known in the literature, this requirement is not compatible with
the ethics of compensation, and we provide a brief discussion of the reason
for this impossibility. In section 4, we consider two ways of relaxing this re-
quirement. First, we consider the implications of the view that the increase
in one person’s effort should have no negative effects on others, and, second,
we consider the opposite view saying that the increase in one person’s effort
should have no positive effects on others. In section 5, we suggest a rather
different point of view, saying that an individual should not gain or lose from
the increase in effort of individuals who already exercise superior effort. Fi-
nally, in section 6, we provide some further comments on how our discussion
of responsibility and reward relates to the more common incentive arguments
in redistribution.
2 Analysis
Consider a society with a population N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, where agent
i’s effort is aEi and her talent a
T
i . We assume that a
E
i , a
T
i ∈ R, where R is
the set of real numbers.4 Let ai =
〈
aEi , a
T
i
〉
be a characteristics vector of i,
a = 〈a1, ..., an〉 a characteristics profile of society (which can be partitioned
into aE =
〈
aE1 , ..., a
E
n
〉
and aT =
〈
aT1 , ..., a
T
n
〉
), Ω ⊆ R2 the set of all possible
characteristics vectors (where ΩE is the set of all possible effort levels and
ΩT the set of all possible talents), and Ω
n ⊆ R2n the set of all possible
characteristics profiles. Let Ω˜n ⊂ Ωn be the set of admissible characteristics
profiles, where for any a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, aT = a˜T . In other words, we do not
consider interprofile conditions with respect to talent,5 but assume that there
is a single characteristics profile of talent in society. This profile, however,
can be any profile within the set of possible profiles. We impose no other
restrictions on the set of permissible characteristics vectors and profiles.
The income function f : Ω → R is assumed to be strictly increasing in
4Hence, we do not consider the multidimensional version of this problem: see Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996).
5See Bossert (1995).
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both arguments and regular. An income function is regular if and only if for
any i, j ∈ N , aTi , aTj ∈ R and any aEi , a˜Ei , aˆEi ∈ R, where aEi > a˜Ei > aˆEi ,
f(aTi , a˜
E
i ) − f(aTi , aˆEi ) > f(aTj , a˜Ei ) − f(aTj , aˆEi ) → f(aTi , aEi ) − f(aTi , a˜Ei )
≥ f(aTj , aEi ) − f(aTj , a˜Ei ).6 To simplify the analysis, but without loss of
generality, we also assume that the marginal productivity of the more tal-
ented always is at least as great as the marginal productivity of the low
talented, i.e. for any i, j ∈ N , aTi , aTj ∈ R and aEi , a˜Ei ∈ R, where aEi > a˜Ei ,
aTi > a
T
j → f(aTi , aEi ) − f(aTi , a˜Ei ) ≥ f(aTj , aEi ) − f(aTj , a˜Ei ). Finally, an effi-
cient redistribution function F : Ω˜n → Rn satisfies the feasibility condition∑n
i=1 Fi(a) =
∑n
i=1 f(ai), ∀a ∈ Ω˜n.
By the ethics of compensation, talent is an irrelevant factor and cannot
justify any inequalities. Thus, if two persons only differ in talent and not in
effort, the redistributive scheme should assign the same post-tax income to
both individuals. Formally, this requirement can be written as follows.
Equal Income for Equal Effort (EIEE): For any a ∈ Ω˜n and i, j ∈ N,
aEi = a
E
j → Fi(a) = Fj(a).
EIEE is an unquestionable implication of the ethics of compensation, and
throughout the paper we will maintain this requirement on the redistributive
mechanism.
It is more problematic to determine how income should be distributed
when considering situations where individuals exercise different levels of ef-
fort. The ethics of responsibility suggests that people should be held re-
sponsible for their choice of effort, but not for being a person with a specific
talent exercising a particular effort level. In general, it is not obvious how to
interpret this idea, and therefore we will approach this problem by looking
at what type of effects a change in one person’s effort should be allowed to
have on others.
3 No effect on others
Intuitively it might seem plausible to claim that the post-tax income of those
individuals who do not change their effort should be unaffected by the change
6In most cases, this condition should be considered acceptable. By way of illustration,
it is common to assume (for example in labour markets) that the marginal productivity
of the more talented is higher than of the less talented for every effort level. However, the
regularity condition does not rule out the opposite case. What it rules out is that there is
a change in the ranking of marginal productivity at a certain effort level.
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in effort of other people. This intuition is captured by the following require-
ment.
No effect on others (NE): For any a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n and k ∈ N, aEj = a˜Ej ,∀j 6=
k → Fj(a) = Fj(a˜).7
According to NE, a change in total pre-tax income due to a change in
one agent’s effort should only affect this person’s post-tax income. However,
as shown by Bossert (1995), there does not exist any efficient redistribution
mechanism that satisfies this requirement and EIEE unless the pre-tax in-
come function is additively separable, i.e. unless the marginal productivity
of effort is independent of talent.
We can illustrate this result by considering a simple example. Assume
that there are two people in society, one with high talent and one with low
talent. They can either exercise high or low effort, and let Figure 1 give their
pre-tax income as a function of effort.
Effort
Talent
High Low
High 100 20
Low 70 0
Figure 1
We note that in Figure 1, the gain in pre-tax income following an increase
in effort depends on talent, where the marginal productivity of the high
talented is greater than of the low talented.
The redistributive scheme has to cover four cases in this economy.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Effort Low Effort
High Effort case 1 case 2
Low Effort case 3 case 4
Figure 2
Let us first look at case 4 where the individuals exercise the same amount
of effort and thus only differ in talent. EIEE demands an equal split in
this situation. Moreover, according to NE, the high talented should not be
affected by a move from case 4 to case 3 and the low talented should not be
affected by a move from case 3 to case 1. Hence, if we take case 4 as the
7This condition is usually referred to as Individual Monotonicity in Effort in the liter-
ature (see for example Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). However, in order to focus on the
similarities between this requirement and other requirements introduced in this paper, we
find the renaming of the condition useful.
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point of departure and assume an efficient redistributive scheme, NE has the
following implications.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Effort Low Effort
High Effort 90,80
Low Effort 10,80 10,10
Figure 3
As is easily seen, the redistributive scheme in Figure 3 violates EIEE in
case 1. And it turns out that this conflict is present in any situation where the
pre-tax income function is not additively separable (Bossert (1995)), unless
we give up the demand of an efficient redistributive scheme.
If we accept inefficiency, then we can satisfy both EIEE and NE by let-
ting the reward of effort be equal to the marginal productivity of the least
talented, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Effort Low Effort
High Effort 80,80 80,10
Low Effort 10,80 10,10
Figure 4
However, we should like to maintain both the requirement of efficiency
and EIEE, and hence our only option is to relax NE. This means that people’s
increase in effort will not always be rewarded by their marginal productivity,
and as a consequence there will be a deficit or a surplus to be distributed
equal to the difference between the change in pre-tax income and the change
in post-tax income of the persons increasing their effort. In other words, some
individuals must experience an increase or a decrease in post-tax income as
a result of an increase in effort by other individuals. But who should be
affected? And how? In the rest of the paper, we look at the implications
of different answers to these questions. Let us stress, however, that our
aim is not to defend a right answer, but rather to clarify the implications
of different views and thereby contribute to the process of establishing a
reflective equilibrium in the Rawlsian sense on this issue.
“When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing
account of his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies vari-
ous reasonable and natural presumptions), he may well revise his
judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory
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does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely
to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviations which
undermines his confidence in his original judgments and if the
conception presented yields a judgment which he finds he can
now accept. From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best
account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his
judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but
rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilib-
rium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person
has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either re-
vised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his
initial convictions (and the corresponding conception)” (Rawls,
1971, p. 48).
With this in mind, we move on to a discussion of different ways of re-
stricting the type of effects an increase in effort by someone should have on
others.
4 Restricting the type of effects on others
If we want to satisfy the ethics of compensation within an efficient redis-
tributive scheme, there will be cases where there is a sacrifice or loss to be
distributed among those who do not change their effort. How should that
be done? An intuitively appealing idea is to say that the surplus or deficit
should be split equally, and we will take this idea as the starting point for the
present discussion. In section 5, however, we will argue that it is not obvious
that we should accept this view, because there might be morally relevant
differences among those who are not affected that should make us support
an unequal split.
Formally speaking, we can state our basic condition as follows.
Equal Effect on Others (EE): For any a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈{
i ∈ N | aEi = a˜Ei
}
, Fj(a)− Fj(a˜) = Fk(a)− Fk(a˜).
EE and EIEE characterize a large class of redistribution schemes, which
includes strict egalitarianism (saying that we should always split the resources
equally). Certainly, strict egalitarianism does not capture our concern for re-
warding effort, and thus immediately we should like to narrow this class
somewhat by imposing a restriction on the redistributive scheme that guar-
antees that the reward of effort is not below the marginal productivity of the
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least talented and not above the marginal productivity of the most talented.
In our view, this restriction follows directly from any reasonable interpreta-
tion of the ethics of responsibility. Let aTmin refer to the minimal talent and
aTmax to the maximal talent in the population. The minimal restriction we
impose on the ethics of responsibility can now be captured by the following
condition.
Restricted Reward (RR): For any a ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈ N, aEj > aEk →
f(aTmin, a
E
j ) − f(aTmin, aEk ) ≤ Fj(a)− Fk(a) ≤ f(aTmax, aEj )− f(aTmax, aEk ).
Even though we narrow the class of permissible redistributive schemes
somewhat by imposing RR, there is still a vast number of perspectives satis-
fying all our present demands. Among them the so-called egalitarian equiv-
alent mechanisms FEE introduced by Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), which
will turn out to be of particular interest in the rest of this discussion.
FEEk (a) := f(a
E
k , t
REF ) − 1
n
∑
i∈N
[
f
(
aEi , t
REF
)− f(ai)] ,∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈
Ω˜n.
FEE assigns to every agent a post-tax income equal to the pre-tax income
she would earn if her talent were equal to the reference talent tREF , plus a
uniform transfer. The uniform transfer secures that the redistributive mech-
anism is efficient. It is rather easy to see that any version of FEE satisfies
EIEE, EE, and RR (as long as we assume that the reference talent is above
the lowest and below the highest talent in society). Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996) provide characterisations of this class of redistributive schemes, but
not of any single mechanism within this class. However, they underline that
“the choice of a particular reference [talent] is an important issue” (p. 344),
and in the following we will provide characterisations that turn out to be use-
ful in this choice. In particular, we will present complete characterisations of
two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms, where the least and most talented,
respectively, is the reference talent.
In order to do this, however we will have to say more about the type of
effects that an increase in effort should have on others. Two opposing views
easily come to mind. On the one hand, we may argue that there should be
no negative effects on others; on the other hand, we may argue that there
should be no positive effects on others. Let us consider the implications of
each of these views?
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4.1 No negative effect on others
If we approach the question about how an increase in effort should affect
others from the perspective of those who do not change their effort, it may
seem reasonable to argue that they should not receive a lower post-tax income
because others increase their effort. The increase in effort is the responsibility
of the person increasing her effort, and it might seem unfair that others should
experience a loss in such a situation.
This requirement can be captured by the following principle.
No negative effect on others (NNE): For any j ∈ N and a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, where
a˜Ej > a
E
j and ai = a˜i ∀i 6= j, Fi(a˜) ≥ Fi(a),∀i 6= j.
By adding NNE to our framework, we obtain a complete characterisation
of a particular egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
Theorem 1 A redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE, EE, RR and
NNE if and only if F = FEE and the reference talent equals the lowest
talent in society.
Proof. The if-part of the theorem is trivial, and hence we will only prove
the only-if part.
(i) Suppose that there exists an F satisfying EIEE, NNE, EE and RR such
that for some a ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈ N , Fj(a)−Fk(a) 6= f(aTmin, aEj )−f(aTmin, aEk ).
Obviously, by EIEE, this is not possible if aEj = a
E
k . Hence, without loss of
generality, we assume that aEj > a
E
k .
(ii) By RR and (i), it follows that Fj(a)−Fk(a) > f(aTmin, aEj )−f(aTmin, aEk ).
(iii) Consider some a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, where a˜Ei = aEk ,∀i ∈ N. By EIEE, Fi(a˜) =
Fk(a˜),∀i ∈ N.
(iv) Let m refer to the least talented in society. Consider some aˆ ∈ Ω˜n,
where aˆEi = a˜
E
i ,∀i 6= m and aˆEm = aEj . By NNE, Fi(aˆi) ≥ Fi(a˜i),∀i 6= m.
(v) Moreover, by construction,
∑
i∈N f(aˆi)−
∑
i∈N f(a˜i) = f(a
T
min, a
E
j )−
f(aTmin, a
E
k ). Hence, taking into account the result established in (iv), Fm(aˆ)−
Fm(a˜) ≤ f(aTmin, aEj ) − f(aTmin, aEk ), and consequently Fm(aˆ) − Fi(aˆ) ≤
f(aTmin, a
E
j )− f(aTmin, aEk ),∀i 6= m.
(vi) Consider some a ∈ Ω˜n, where ai = aˆi, ∀i 6= j, k and aj = aj and
ak = ak. By EE, Fm(a)−Fi(a) = Fm(aˆ)−Fi(aˆ),∀i 6= j, k.Moreover, by EIEE,
Fj(a) = Fm(a) and Fk(a) = Fi(a), ∀i 6= j,m. Hence, Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fm(aˆ)−
Fi(aˆ) ≤ f(aTmin, aEj ) − f(aTmin, aEk ). By EE, Fj(a) − Fk(a) = Fj(a) − Fk(a),
which violates (ii). Hence, the supposition in (i) is not possible.
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(vii) Consequently, we know that for any a ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈ N ,
Fj(a) − Fk(a) = f(aTmin, aEj ) − f(aTmin, aEk ). Moreover, by efficiency, Fk(a) =∑
i∈N f(ai) −
∑
i6=k Fi(a) and similarly for j. Without loss of general-
ity, let us only consider the post-tax income of k. By straightforward
manipulation, we find that nFk(a) =
∑
i∈N f(ai) −
∑
i∈N(Fi(a) − Fk(a)),
and thus, taking into account the result established in (vi), we have that
nFk(a) =
∑
i∈N f(ai) −
∑
i∈N(f(a
T
min, a
E
i ) − f(aTmin, aEk )). Hence, Fk(a) =
f(aTmin, a
E
k )− 1n
∑
i∈N
[
f
(
aTmin, a
E
i
)− f(ai)], which completes the proof.
Let us briefly illustrate how this redistributive mechanism works in the
example considered in section 3.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Low
High 85,85 85,15
Low 10,80 10,10
Figure 5
As we can see from Figure 5, the difference between the marginal produc-
tivity of the less talented and the marginal productivity of the more talented
is shared equally when the more talented increases her effort. More gener-
ally, there will be an equal split of such a surplus among all the members of
society.
An immediate objection to this property of the redistribution function is
that it is unreasonable that the low talented should gain simply by the fact
that the more talented increases her effort. It can be argued that there is no
justification for a compensation of this kind, and we now turn to a discussion
of the implications of endorsing such a perspective.
4.2 No positive effect on others
If we take the perspective of the individual who increases her effort, it may be
argued that there is no reason that others should benefit from such a move.
This intuition is captured by the following requirement.
No positive effect on others (NPE): For any j ∈ N and a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, where
a˜Ej > a
E
j and ai = a˜i ∀i 6= j, Fi(a˜) ≤ Fi(a),∀i ∈ N.
By substituting NPE for NNE in our framework, we obtain a complete
reversal of the conclusion in the previous subsection.
Theorem 2 An efficient redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE, EE,
RR and NPE if and only if F = FEE and the reference talent equals the
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highest talent in society.
Proof. The if-part of the theorem is trivial, and hence we will only prove
the only-if part.
(i) Suppose that there exists an F satisfying EIEE, NPE, EE and RR such
that for some a ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈ N , Fj(a)−Fk(a) 6= f(aTmax, aEj )−f(aTmax, aEk ).
Obviously, by EIEE, this is not possible if aEj = a
E
k . Hence, without loss of
generality, we assume that aEj > a
E
k .
(ii) By RR and (i), it follows that Fj(a) − Fk(a) < f(aTmax, aEj ) −
f(aTmax, a
E
k ).
(iii) Consider some a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, where a˜Ei = aEk ,∀i ∈ N. By EIEE, Fi(a˜) =
Fk(a˜),∀i ∈ N.
(iv) Let m refer to the most talented in society. Consider some aˆ ∈ Ω˜n,
where aˆEi = a˜
E
i ,∀i 6= m and aˆEm = aEj . By NPE, Fi(aˆi) ≤ Fi(a˜i),∀i 6= m.
(v) Moreover, by construction,
∑
i∈N f(aˆi)−
∑
i∈N f(a˜i) = f(a
T
max, a
E
j )−
f(aTmax, a
E
k ). Hence, taking into account the result established in (iv) and the
efficiency of F , Fm(aˆ)−Fm(a˜) ≥ f(aTmax, aEj )−f(aTmax, aEk ), and consequently
Fm(aˆ)− Fi(aˆ) ≥ f(aTmax, aEj )− f(aTmax, aEk ),∀i 6= m.
(vi) Consider some a ∈ Ω˜n, where ai = aˆi, ∀i 6= j, k and aj = aj and
ak = ak. By EE, Fm(a)−Fi(a) = Fm(aˆ)−Fi(aˆ),∀i 6= j, k.Moreover, by EIEE,
Fj(a) = Fm(a) and Fk(a) = Fi(a), ∀i 6= j,m. Hence, Fj(a)−Fk(a) = Fm(aˆ)−
Fi(aˆ) ≥ f(aTmax, aEj ) − f(aTmax, aEk ). By EE, Fj(a) − Fk(a) = Fj(a) − Fk(a),
which violates (ii). Hence, the supposition in (i) is not possible.
(vii) Consequently, we know that for any a ∈ Ω˜n and j, k ∈ N ,
Fj(a) − Fk(a) = f(aTmax, aEj ) − f(aTmax, aEk ). Moreover, by efficiency, Fk(a)
=
∑
i∈N f(ai) −
∑
i6=k Fi(a) and similarly for j. Without loss of gener-
ality, let us only consider the post-tax income of k. By straightforward
manipulation, we find that nFk(a) =
∑
i∈N f(ai) −
∑
i∈N(Fi(a) − Fk(a)),
and thus taking into account the result established in (vi), nFk(a) =∑
i∈N f(ai)−
∑
i∈N(f(a
T
max, a
E
i )−f(aTmax, aEk )). Hence, Fk(a) = f(aEk , aTmax)−
1
n
∑
i∈N
[
f
(
aEi , a
T
max
)− f(ai)], which completes the proof.
Let us briefly illustrate how FEE works when the most talented is the
reference talent in our example.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Low
High 85,85 90,10
Low 5,85 10,10
Figure 6
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As we can see from Figure 6, the consequence of imposing NPE is that the
more talented experiences a loss when the less talented increases her effort.
The reward assigned to the less talented equals the marginal productivity of
the more talented, and this creates a deficit which in this example is shared
equally by the two persons. More generally, there will be an equal split of
such a deficit among all the members of society.
4.3 Trade-offs between positive and negative effects
We have so far considered what can be viewed as the extreme positions in
this debate, where either we only assign importance to avoiding positive or
to avoiding negative effects on others. An intermediate position would be
to find both effects problematic, and thus to seek trade-offs between them.
One way of doing that would be to adopt equivalent egalitarian mechanisms
that are in between the polar cases discussed in the two previous subsections.
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) considers one such option in particular, to wit
when the reference talent equals the average talent in the population. In our
standard example, this mechanism works as illustrated in Figure 7.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Low
High 85,85 87.5,12.5
Low 7.5,82.5 10,10
Figure 7
As we can see, when the average talent is the reference talent, there
are both negative and positive effects on others. When the more talented
increases her effort, the less talented gains, whereas, when the less talented
increases her effort, the more talented looses. However, comparing this mech-
anism with the two polar cases, one should notice that allowing for both pos-
itive and negative effects reduces the size of the effect on others. In Figure
7, the size of the loss (gain) imposed on the other person is 2.5, whereas the
loss (gain) in Figure 5 (Figure 6) is 5.
This may give us a hint about how to characterise the average mechanism,
to wit by imposing a condition saying that we should seek to minimize the
overall effect on others. However, we will not pursue this line of reasoning
here, but rather turn to a discussion of an alternative perspective on this
problem. So far, we have worked within the framework of EE, saying that
any sacrifice or loss to be distributed among those who do not change their
effort should be split equally. This might seem uncontroversial, but we should
12
now like to argue that it is not.
5 Restricting who should be affected
Consider a situation where the only factor under a person’s control is the
number of hours she works. Let us furthermore assume that the hourly wage
given to a high talented person is less than her marginal productivity. In
this situation an increase in the hours she works will create a surplus that
has to be distributed among the individuals in the population. Is it fair that
this surplus is distributed equally among all individuals independent of how
many hours they work? Or is it more reasonable that the share of burdens
and benefits should somehow be related to how many hours a person work
so as to give those who work long hours a larger share? In other words, when
considering how to split the surplus among those who do not increase their
effort, should we consider their effort level a morally relevant factor that
justifies an unequal split?
One way to relate the distribution of burdens and benefits to a person’s
effort level is to hold that the post-tax income of a person should not be
affected if people who already exercise a higher effort level increase their
effort even further. This view could be justified by viewing each effort level
as a cooperative venture and argue that the benefits or cost associated with
any such cooperative venture should only be distributed among those who
participate in that venture. Formally, we capture the perspective by the
following condition.
No effect from superior effort (NESE): For any j ∈ N and a, a˜ ∈ Ω˜n,
where a˜Ej = a
E
j and a˜
E
k > a
E
k ≥ aEj , ∀k ∈
{
i ∈ N | a˜Ei 6= aEi
} −→ Fj(a˜) =
Fj(a).
One part of this requirement, that you should not gain from others supe-
rior effort, can also be seen as capturing the idea that ‘you can not complain
if you do not try’, i.e. only those who make a comparable effort can make a
claim on the gains from others effort.
While NNE and NPE were compatible with EE on a general basis, this
is not the case for NESE.
Theorem 3 There does not exist any efficient redistribution mechanism F
satisfying EIEE, EE and NESE, unless f is additively separable.
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Proof. It is easily seen that the conditions are compatible if f is addi-
tively separable, and hence we will only prove that they are not compatible
on a general basis.
(i) Suppose F satisfies EIEE, EE and NESE. Consider some a ∈ Ω˜n,
where for some j, k ∈ N, aTj > aTk and aEi = aEj = aEk ,∀i ∈ N . By EIEE,
Fj(a) = Fk(a).
(ii) Consider a˜ ∈ Ω˜n, where a˜i = ai,∀i 6= j and a˜Ej > aEj . By NESE,
Fi(a˜) = Fi(a),∀i 6= j. Hence, from the efficiency of F , it follows that Fj(a˜)−
Fj(a) = f(a˜j)− f(aj).
(iii) Consider aˆ ∈ Ω˜n, where aˆi = a˜i,∀i 6= k and aˆEk = a˜Ej .By NESE,
Fi(aˆ) = Fi(a˜),∀i 6= j, k. Moreover, by EE, Fj(aˆ) − Fi(aˆ) = Fj(a˜) − Fi(a˜),
∀i 6= j, k. Hence, Fj(aˆ) = Fj(a˜) and from the efficiency of F it follows that
Fk(aˆ)− Fk(a˜) = f(aˆk)− f(a˜k).
(iv) By assumption, aTj > a
T
k . If f is not additively separable, we know
that there exist effort levels such that the marginal productivity of the more
talented is strictly above the marginal productivity of the less talented. Let us
assume that this is the case for aEj and a˜
E
j , which implies that f(a˜j)−f(aj) >
f(aˆk)−f(a˜k). Consequently, taking into account the results established in (ii)
and (iii), Fj(aˆ) > Fk(aˆ). But this violates EIEE, and hence the supposition
in (i) is not possible.
Let us now look at the implications of substituting NESE for EE within
our framework. For this purpose, consider the following redistribution mech-
anism, where for any j ∈ N , aEmin +j refers to the jth least talented in society
and n(aEl ) is the cardinality of N(a
E
l ) =
{
i ∈ N | aEi ≥ l
}
.
FNEk (a) :=
1
n
∑
i∈Nf(a
T
i , a
E
min)+
aEk∑
l=aEmin +1
1
n(aEl )
∑
i∈N(aEl )
[
f(aTi , a
E
l ) - f(a
T
i , a
E
l−1)
]
,
∀k ∈ N , ∀a ∈ Ω˜n.
FNE works in the following way. First, all individuals are given an equal
share of the the total pre-tax income that would have been produced if all
individuals exerted the minimal effort level actually exercised in society. And
persons actually exercising the minimal effort level does not get anything
more than this. The rest of the population also receives a share equal to
1
n(aEmin +1)
of the increase in total pre-tax income (compared to the case where
everyone exercises the minimal effort level) due to the fact that these people
exercise at least the effort level aEmin +1. Persons actually exercising the second
lowest effort level do not get anything more than the total of these two shares,
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and in the same manner we move to the third lowest effort level and so on.
We can illustrate FNE by looking at the post-tax income distribution of
our standard example.
Low Talent
High Talent
High Low
High 85,85 90,10
Low 10,80 10,10
Figure 8
The difference between this approach and the egalitarian equivalent mech-
anisms is best illustrated by comparing the move from case 4 to case 2 with
the move from case 3 to case 1 in our example. In both situations, the only
thing that happens is that the more talented increases her effort. But in
one case, when going from 4 to 2, the present approach endorses that the
less talented is not affected, because the less talented does not exercise a
comparable level of effort, whereas in the other case the approach demands
a compensation to the less talented. More generally, this approach justifies
an unequal split of any surplus or deficit to be distributed among those who
do not increase their effort, because it views the actual effort level exercised
by these people a morally relevant factor.
It turns out that FNE is the only redistribution mechanism compatible
with NESE and EIEE.
Theorem 4 An efficient redistribution mechanism F satisfies EIEE and
NESE if and only if F = FNE.
Proof. It is easily seen that FNE satisfies EIEE and NESE. Hence,
we will only prove that if F satisfies EIEE and NESE, then F = FNE.To
simplify the proof and without loss of generality, we assume that aE1 ≤ aE2 ≤
...aEn−1 ≤ aEn for any a ∈ Ω˜n.
(i) Consider any a ∈ Ω˜n and k ∈ N and the following sequence:
1
a
E
= (aE1 , ....., a
E
1 ),
2
a
E
= (aE1 , a
E
2 ....., a
E
2 ),
.
.
k−1
a
E
= (aE1 , a
E
2 , ..., a
E
k−1, ...., a
E
k−1),
k
a
E
= (aE1 , a
E
2 , ..., a
E
k−1, a
E
k ...., a
E
k ).
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By NESE, for any t in the sequence, it follows that Fi(
t+1
a ) = Fi(
t
a),∀i ≤ t.
(ii) By EIEE, it follows that Fk(
t
a) = Fi(
t
a),∀i ≥ t ≤ k.
(iii) Hence, by the results established in (i) and (ii) and the efficiency of
F , we have that Fk(
t+1
a ) = Fk(
t
a) + 1
n(aEt+1)
∑
i∈N(aEt+1)
[
f(aTi , a
E
t+1)− f(aTi , aEt )
]
.
Consequently, Fk(
k
a) = Fk(
1
a) +
aEk∑
l=aE2
1
n(aEl )
∑
i∈N(aEl )
[
f(aTi , a
E
l )− f(aTi , aEl−1)
]
.
(iv) By NESE, Fk(
k
a) = Fk(a), and the result follows from noticing that
Fk(
1
a) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
f(aTi , a
E
min).
6 Responsibility and incentives
We have discussed different redistributive mechanisms under the assumption
that effort is unaffected by the tax system. The justification for this approach
was that we wanted to focus on the relationship between responsibility and
reward. The ethics of responsibility presents a justification for rewarding
effort even in the absence of incentive considerations. However, if the reward
from effort differs from the increase in one’s pre-tax income, some individuals
must experience an increase or a decrease in post-tax income as a result of an
increase in effort by others. We have shown that restrictions on who should
be affected and how they should be allowed to be affected, have important
implications for our choice of redistributive mechanism.
This discussion is of interest because economic theory has been preoccu-
pied with welfaristic normative theories where considerations of responsibility
do not play any independent role. Welfaristic theories view reward as an in-
centive used to induce certain behavior, and not as something of intrinsic
importance in normative reasoning. Let us provide a simple illustration of
this difference. Assume that the utility functions of the individuals are ad-
ditively separable in income and leisure and, moreover, that the supply of
labor is perfectly inelastic. In this situation, there will be no reason for a
welfarist to reward those individuals who work longer hours. The only rea-
son to deviate from strict egalitarianism would be if some individual had a
higher marginal utility from income. However, common sense, and impor-
tant non-welfarist normative traditions, hold that effort should be rewarded
even if the reward does not affect behavior. People deserve a certain reward
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for their effort irrespectively of the incentive effect. Clearly, incentive effects
are also of much importance, and an interesting question for further research
is therefore how incentive and desert considerations can be combined in a
redistributive framework.8
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